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JUSTICE N.D. KRISHNA RAO MEMORIAL LECTURE
ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: JUDICIAL
OBLIGATION OR JUDICIAL ACTIVISM*
t
The Hon. Justice Mr. A.S. Anand
I consider it a great honour and privilege to have been invited to deliver the
Justice Krishna Rao Memorial Lecture for the year 1997.
I have not had the pleasure of meeting Late Justice N.D. Krishna Rao, a
distinguished Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court personally but from many
who knew him well, I have learnt that he was a brilliant Judge with an equally
brilliant academic record. He passed his B.Sc. (Hons.) in Chemistry from the
Madras Presidency College, standing First in the University. Later he went to
England and passed the much coveted Indian Ci viI Services Examination in 1927.
After returning to India he worked as Sub-Collector for sometime and then opted
for the judiciary. He served as District Judge before being elevated to the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in 1955. He retired in 1966. His friends and admirers say that
he was a charming person and a pleasing human being. The judgements rendered
by him show that he had a keen and incisive intellect. He mastered the facts and
was an excellent Judge of facts, seldom ever making a mistake on a question of
fact. He had, I am told, somewhat pungent sense of humor, which was tempered
by a high sense of integrity. He was realist and did not indulge in any fanciful highflying. He won the acclaim of all concerned. He was a sound Judge all round and
I have been greatly impressed by what I have learnt about him. I, therefore, stand
before you in all humility to dedicate this lecture to his memory.
I now come to the subject of the lecture today: "Protection of Human
Rights - Judicial Obligation or Judicial Activism".
To appreciate the topic, which is of current relevance, we have to appreciate
not only what are "human rights" but also re-evaluate the role of the judiciary in
the context of the protection of those rights and to examine whether the development of the law as response to the judiciary to the needs of the society is a constitutional obligation of some sort of "activism" or "adventurism" being indulged into
by the judiciary. First, what are "human rights" and how are those protected and
enforced.
"Human rights" are those rights which inhere in every human being by virtue
of being a person. These are nothing but the modem name of what had been tradi*
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tionally known as "natural rights", i.e., rights bestowed upon human beings by
nature. "Human rights" are based on mankind's increasing demand for a decent
civilized life in which the inherent dignity of each human being is well respected
and protected. Human rights are fundamental to our very existence without which
we cannot live as human beings. The basic human rights constitute what might be
called, 'sacrosanct rights' from which no derogation can be permitted in a civilized society. The bare necessities, the minimum and basic requirements which
are essential and unavoidable for a person are the core of human rights concept.
Human rights are universal and cut across all national boundaries and political
frontiers.
The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
" ... It is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last
resort to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should
be protected by the rule of law."
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly on 10th December, 1948 provides:
"Everyone has a right to life, liberty and security of person."
Section 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, lays down:
"Human rights means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity
of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India."
Prof. Louis Henkin of Columbia University in his article "Rights Here and
There"! explained human rights as:
" ...claims which every individual has, or should have, upon the society in
which she or he lives. To call them human rights suggests that they are universal; they are the due of every human being in every human society. They
do not differ with geography or history, culture or ideology, political or economic system or stage of development. They do not depend on gender or
race, class or 'status'. To call them 'rights' implies that they are claims 'as of
right' not merely appeals to grace, or charity or brotherhood or love; they
need not be earned or deserved. They are more than aspirations or assertions
of 'the good' but claims of entitlement and corresponding obligation in some
political order under some applicable law, if only in a moral order under a
moral law.
81 Col. L. Rev. 1582 (1981).
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When used carefully, 'human rights' are not some abstract, inchoate 'good'.
The rights are particular, defined, and familiar, reflecting respect for individual dignity and a substantial measure of indi vidual autonomy, as well as a
common sense of justice and injustice."
When we talk about a Constitution, it is important to bear in mind that the
Constitution though by itself an important document is after all cold print on a
piece of paper. What is important to remember is the system the Constitution
seeks to introduce and the way that system works. The Constitution no matter how
well crafted it is, will not be able to deliver the goods unless the system which it
introduces functions effectively to realise the dreams of the founding fathers of
the Constitution. When we talk of the Constitution as living law it is usually understood to refer to the doctrines and understandings that the courts have invented,
developed, spread and applied to make the constitution work in every situation.
Unless life can be pumped into the cold print of the constitution to keep it vibrant
at all times it shall cease to be a living law. Generally speaking, this role of pumping life is assigned to the higher courts, more particularly under a Constitution
which has separation of powers as its core. The Constitution of a State essentially
reflects the aims and aspirations ofthe people who gave to themselves the Constitution. It is well accepted that while a Bill of Rights (like the Chapter of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of India) is the conscience of the Constitution an independent judiciary is its conscience keeper.
The constitutional law starts and gets into motion only when though a constitutional right is ascertained but the authorities refuse to recognise it. It is at that
stage that the cause enters the portals of the courts. The Constitution being the
suprema-lex, every institution created under the Constitution is expected to
respect its command and no organ or instrumentality of the government, not the
President, not the Prime Minister, not the Parliament, not the policeman in uniform, not even the Judge, can ignore it. Its words are law which every State instrumentality must respect and enforce. The courts are in the scheme of the Constitution, guardians of the Constitution, though not the only guardians, and upon them
rests the responsibility to check unconstitutional behaviour and enforce the
constitutional mandate. Every instrumentality under the Constitution is charged
with similar duties and obligations, courts are just the last resort. Under the Constitution, judicial institutions have a role to play not only for resolving inter se
disputes but also to act as a balancing mechanism between the conflicting pulls
and pressures operating in a society. Courts of law are the products of the Constitution and the intrumentalities for fulfilling the ideals of the State enshrined therein
according to the language of the law. Evolving new juristic principles for the
development and growth of law is an accepted role of the judiciary in almost all
the countries.
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The function of the higher courts in this country has not been limited to exploring what the Constitution makers meant when they wrote those words but also
to develop and adopt the law so as to meet the challenges of contemporary problems of the society and respond to the needs of the society. The Constitution cannot be a living and dynamic instrument if it lives in the past only and does not
address the present and the future. This exercise of jurisdiction by the courts in
India has been criticized by some as "judicial activism" indulged by non-elected
judges who upset the decisions of the elected representatives of the people. They
would like the courts to confine themselves to what the Constitution makers actually or literally meant when the Constitution was drafted. But is it possible to say
that the word or expression must mean the same thing at all times regardless of
changing times and situations? After another fifty years will the Judges still be
carrying out the exercise of digging out what meaning was assigned to a word a
century back! That may be in my opinion the surest way to kill the Constitution
and be wedded to the status-quo. The world changes - should not the judiciary try
to make the Constitution work in changed circumstances?
Judicial Review is an essential component of the rule oflaw, which is a basic
feature of the Indian Constitution. Every State action has to be tested on the anvil
of rule of law and that exercise is performed, when occasion arises by the reason
of a doubt raised in that behalf, by the courts. This well established constitutional
principle of the existence of the power of judicial review, and its need was indicated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.2 He said: "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is". At
that time, it appeared to be an innovation or an act which is now being termed as
"judicial activism". However, no one since then has doubted the correctness of
this constitutional imperati ve in the scheme of separation of powers. Over a period
of 47 years, beginning from 1950 when the Constitution conferred on the High
Courts, the power to issue prerogative orders and writs, the judiciary in India has
come to control by judicial review every aspect of governmental and public functions. Every legislation is amenable to judicial review, be it momentous amendments to the Constitution or drawing up of schemes and bye-laws of municipal
bodies which effect the life of a citizen. Judicial review extends to every Governmental or executive action - from high policy matters like the President's power to
issue a Proclamation on failure of constitutional machinery in the States like in
Bommai3 case, to the highly discretionary exercise of the prerogative of pardon

2

(1802) 2 L.Ed. 60.

3

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 see 1.
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like in Kehar Singh'/ case or the right to go abroad as in Satwant Singh'i case.
Judicial review knows no bounds except the restraint of the Judges themselves
regarding justiciability of an issue in a particular case.
The growth of judicial review is the inevitable response of the judiciary to
ensure proper check on the exercise of public power. Growing awareness of the
rights in the people; the trend of judicial scrutiny of every significant Governmental action and the readiness even of the executive to seek judicial determination of
debatable or controversial issues, at times, may be, to avoid its accountability for
the decision, have all resulted in the increasing significance of the rile of the judiciary. There is a general perception that the judiciary in this country has been
active in expansion of the field of judicial review into nontraditional areas, which
earlier were considered beyond judicial purview. Some critics objects to the enlargement of the scope of judicial power beyond its orthodox limits. But this criticism, notwithstanding the expanded role of the judiciary has received acceptability not only by the people but by other wings of the State as well. What may
appear to be non-traditional at the time of the performance of such a task by the
judiciary to be described as "Judicial Activism", when considered in proper perspective may turn out to be really the process of development of the law to respond to the needs of the society. Intervention into such areas is because of the
peoples' perception that judicial intervention is perhaps the only feasible correctional remedy available. There is therefore no reason to treat this exercise as an
attempt by the judiciary to 'clutch at jurisdiction' or to usurp the function of any
other organ of the State. In this context, let us not forget that the role of the judiciary commences only when its jurisdiction is invoked in a cause brought in a court
of law, on the perception that the remedy to the aggrieved is not available elsewhere. In that event, should the judiciary express its helpnesses, or should it make
an attempt to give meaning and content to the law which provides a solution to the
problem brought before it? To reaffirm the faith of the people in the rule of the
law, to preserve democracy and confirm the belief in the Latin Maxim ubi jus ibi
remedium - that there is a remedy under the law for every legal injury - the judiciary is under a constitutional obligation to exercise its jurisdiction to meet the
challenge because law abhors a vacuum. When a citizen is unable to get redress
from the other branches of the government, the courts do sometimes need to step
in because if the courts also shut their doors to the citizen in that event, he is likely
to take to the road, which would be bad for the preservation of rule of law.
Lord Denning while concluding his first "Hamlyn Lecture" under the title
"Freedom under the Law" in 1949 warned:

see 209.

4

Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) I
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Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramaratllllam. Asst. Passport Officer, AIR 1967

se 1836.
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"No one can suppose that the executive will never be guilty of the sins that
are common to all of us. You may be sure that they will sometimes do things
which they ought not to do: and will not do things that they ought to do. But
if and when wrongs are thereby suffered by any of us what is the remedy?
Our procedure for securing our personal freedom is efficient, our procedure
for preventing the abuse of power is not. Just as the pick and shovel is no
longer suitable for the wining of coal, so also the procedure of mandamus,
certiorari, and actions on the case are not suitable for the winning freedom in
the new age. They must be replaced by new and up to date machinery, by
declarations, injuncitons and actions for negligence ... This is not the task for
Parliament ... the courts must do this. Of all the great tasks that lie ahead this
is the greatest. Properly exercised the new powers of the executive lead to the
welfare state; but abused they lead to a totalitarian state. None such must
ever be allowed in this country."
This warning, in a way sums up, what the courts of law are expected to do
when faced with a problem touching upon the abuse of freedom or human rights
of a citizen.
Mr. c.R. Irani, in his article "Cry, the beloved country,,6 says:
"When the executive refuses to apply the law and wilfully, constantly and
conspicuously refuse to do their duty, it falls to the judiciary to act in defence
of the Constitution and the mandate of the rule of law and equality before
law."
Thus, the enlightened opinion welcomes the social role sought to be played
by the courts perhaps because of the lack of public trust in many of the politicians
of the present time, and the executive in their hands.
In human affairs there is a constant recurring cycle of change and experiment. A society changes as the norms acceptable to the society undergo a change.
Old ideologies and old systems give place to new set of ideologies and new systems. The judges haveto be alive to this reality and while discharging their constitutional duties have to develop and expound the law on those lines acting within
the bounds and limits set outfor them in the Constitution. Judicial creativity (often being termed as judicial activism) as a means of evolving new juristic principles for the development and growth of law, is an accepted and well recognised
role of the judiciary not only in this country but in almost all the common law
countries. The law must move with the times and the judiciary has for ever to
remain alive to this reality. This role of the judiciary is not new either in India or

6

The Statesman, August 9, 1997.
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elsewhere. It has been there all along. The current judicial process which have
gives rise to the debate on judicial activism, is merely a continuation of the justice
delivery system which has been prevalent in this country all along. The reason for
this judicial creativity is not far to seek.
Remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much as the
"protector and guarantor of the indefeasible human rights of the citizens" and that
the courts have an obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their
aspirations. The Court, therefore, moulded the relief by granting compensation by
way of penalizing the wrong doer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on
the State which failed in its public duty to protect human rights of the citizen. It
was stressed that public body or officials should not act unlawfully and should
perform their public duties in accordance with law. This was done by the court in
exercise of it public jurisdiction. The Court explained the purpose of public law
and said "that the purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power" but
also to assure to the citizens that they live under a legal system which aims to
protect and preserve the rule of law. Thus, new "tools" were invented to give
redress to the citizen.
What has been and is being done by the higher judiciary in India today is not
something which can be said to be a "new innovations". Let us not fool ourselves
into believing that present generation is the pioneer in this field. Ours is only a
participatory role in an ongoing judicial process. Life of law generally speaking, is
not logic but experience and experience is the basis for the development and evolution of law, which cannot be allowed to remain static. The judiciary in various
other jurisdictions has also been involved in developing law to meet the changing
needs of the society. Let us in this connection analyse the process of development
of law by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Dred Scott v. Stanfori that
court held that a negro was the property of his master and not a 'citizen' thereby
legitimizing "slavery" and discrimination on the grounds of 'colour' and 'creed'.
This doctrine was cast away, a century later by the same court, in Brown v. Board
of Education,S when it said that slavery is a 'dehumanizing', despicable institution
denying human dignity to such an extent that no court of law can uphold it and
later that court gave it a decent burial in Bakke's case. This happened not because
the court was indulging in some sort of activism but because the court was alive to
the changing need of the society. The court realised that the values which guided
the society when Dred Scott's case came to be decided had undergone a sea change

7
8

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and could not stand the scrutiny of the age when the judgment in Brown's case or
Bakke's case was given. It cannot be denied that the law laid down in the nineteenth century - however, suited to social conditions prevailing at that time - may
not be suitable to the social necessities of the twentieth century and the judiciary
has, therefore, to mould and shape the principles of law to meet the needs of the
people in the twentieth century. In the United States of America also, oflate there
has been some criticism of the so-called activist role of the judiciary because of
certain pronouncements. There is tension between "judicial activism" and "judicial restraint", but this has not come in the way of that court to continue to take
some bold and courageous steps in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution in
matters such as prohibition of school prayer and police invasion of individual civil
liberties. The court has even protected the bakers by regulating the hours of their
work in Lochmer v. New York9 under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Even in Great Britain, which has no written Constitution and where Parliament is sovereign and is source of all power and trend of expansion of judicial
review has been quite marked and the judiciary has been taking a much more
active course. The recent trend of judicial review in England (which even became
subject matter of a debate in the House of Lords in June 1996) as indicated in an
article by Anthony Lewis is interesting. In his article - "Judges in Britain create a
Flutter"IO he said that the significant change towards judicial activism in British
Courts is on account of outlook of Judges and the functions they perform. The
reasons given in the analysis made therein are interesting. I quote:
"(1) the Judges realise that there is a vacuum since the Parliament is virtually
under the total control of the executive when it was supposed to correct any
Government injustice to individual;
(2) the modern legislation is loosely drafted and delegates large powers to
the Government which tends often to be arbitrary in its exercise;
(3) the new generation of judges think of law not as fixed rules but as a set of
values designed above all to protect democracy and human rights; and
(4) the new judicial generation is more outward-looking and is influenced by
the Courts in Commonwealth countries, for example, India in the rigorous
enforcement of individual rights:"
The article ends thus:
"The politicians, or many of them, will resist judicial review. But my guess is
that the British public likes it when judges stand up for them against the State

9

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

10

Times of India, Bombay Edition, 7th November, 1995.
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- and that the public will demand more of the new constitutionalism, not less."
Please mark the identity of the views of the critics in the context of Indian
experience also!!
Like the United States of America, in India too in the post constitutional era
law has been in the process of evolution. In 1950 in A.K. Gopalan's casell the
Supreme Court placed a rather narrow and restrictive interpretation upon Article
21 of the Constitution. By a majority, it was held in Gopalan's case that the "procedure established by law", means procedure established by a law made by the
State" and the Court refused to infuse in that procedure the principles of natural
justice. The court evolved the doctrine of exclusivity and declined to infuse the
rights contained in Article 19 for want of capacity to enjoy the same. The doctrine
of exclusivity of fundamental rights as evolved in Gopalan's case was thrown
overboard by the same court about two decades later in Bank Nationalisation 12
case and four years later in 1974, in Hardhan Saha's'3 case the Supreme Court
judged the constitutionality of preventive detention with reference to Article 19
also.
Twenty eight years after the judgment in Gopalan's case, the Supreme Court
in Maneka Gandhi'sl4 case pronounced that the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must be "right, just and fair" and not arbitrary; it must pass the "test of
reasonableness" and the procedure should be in conformity with the principles of
natural justice and unless it was so, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.
The Supreme Court has been consistently expanding the dimensions of Art.
21 (Right to Life & Personal Liberty) within the bounds of law by purposeful
interpretations. More than fifteen years ago in F.c. Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhils Bhagwati J observed:
"The right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that
goes along with it, namely, the bare necessities oflife such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing
oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling
with fellow human beings. The magnitude and content of the components of

11 A. K. Gopalan v. Govt. of India, AIR 1950 se 27.
12 R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 see 248; AIR 1970 se 564.
13 Hardhan Saha v. State ofW.B., (1975) 3 see 198; AIR 1974 see 2154.
14 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 see 248.
15

(1981) 1 see 608; 1981 2 SeR 516.
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this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the
country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the right to the basic
necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities
as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human self. Every act which
offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro
tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other
fundamental rights."
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha's'6 case the Supreme Court reiterated once again
that right to life guaranteed by Article 21 included the right to live with human
dignity, free from exploitation. In M ohini Jain's 17 case, the Court held the right to
free education to the children until they complete the age of 14 years also to be a
fundamental right by taking note of the Article 45 of the Constitution. The concern of the courts of the under-privileged and the poor sections of the society was
reflected a decade ago in Bihar Support Society v. The Chief Justice of India,
when the court said:
18

" ... that the weaker sections ofIndia Humanity have been deprived of justice
for long, long years: they have had no access to justice on account of their
poverty, ignorance and illiteracy. They are not aware of the rights and benefits conferred upon them by the Constitution and the law. On account of
their socially and economically disadvantaged position they lack the capacity to assert their rights and they do not have the material resources with
which to enforce their social and economic entitlements and combat exploitation and injustice."
In M.H. Hoskot'sl9 case, the Supreme Court recognised the right of an indigent person to have legal aid.
The courts have been making judicial intervention in cases concerning violation of human rights as an ongoing judicial process. Decisions on such matters as
the right to protection against solitary confinement as in Sunil Batra20 the right not
to be held in fetters as in Sobraj'/I case; the right against handcuffing as in T. V.

16 Bandhua Mukti Moreha v. Union of India , (1984) 3 see 161; AIR 1984
17 MohiniJain
18

(1986) 4

(Miss) v. State of Kamataka, (1992) 2

see

se 802.

see 666.

767.

19

M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3

20

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn., (1978) 4

21

Charles Sobhraj v. Supdt., Central Jail, (1978)

see 494;

see 544; AIR 1978 se 1548.
se 1675.
4 see 104; AIR 1978 1514.
AIR 1978
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Vatheeswaran's22 case the right against custodial violence as in Nilabati Behera 'i3
case or the rights of the arrestee as in D.K.Basu'i4 case or right of the female
employees not to be sexually harassed at the place of work as in the case of
Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan25 are just a few pointers in that directions. I need
not multiply illustrations.
It would, therefore, be wrong to call it as an act of "judicial activism" when
the judiciary in discharge of its constitutional powers seeks to protect the human
rights of the citizens in case after case where a citizen has been deprived of his life
or liberty otherwise than in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law or
when the courts insist upon "transparency and accountability" in respect of the
orders made or action taken by public servants. The requirement that every state
action must satisfy the test of fairness and non-arbitrariness are judicially evolved
principles which now form part of the constitutional law .
There is of late some criticism also of the judiciary in respect of its role in
cases involving environment. It is said that courts have started acting as
"environalists" without "any expertise" in that field and that the courts earlier on
did not venture into this field.
The right to pollution free environment has to be conceived of as a human
right being a facet of right to life guaranteed by Article 21. Let us not forget that
while human rights are necessary to promote the personality development of human beings, healthy environment is necessary to safeguard conditions conducive
to such a personality development. There is a natural link between environment,
development and human rights. It ought to be remembered that human rights are
based on mankind's increasing demand for a decent, civilized life in which the
inherent dignity of each human being must receive respect and protection. Human rights are fundamental to human nature and therefore the relationship between environment and human rights becomes much too obvious. In other words,
human rights and environment are interdependent. As such it can be legitimately
argued that the right to an adequate environment is a human right because human
species cannot exist on this planet without proper environment. Supreme Court
has ruled that right to pollution free air falls under Article 21 in Subhas Kumar v.
State of Bihar. 26

22

T.v. Vatheeswaran v. State ofT.N., (1983) 2 see 68; AIR 1983 se 361.

23

Nilabati Behra v. State of Orissa. , (1993) 2 see 746

24 D.K. Basu v. State ofT.N., (1997) 1 see 416.
25 (1997) 6 see 241.
26

(1991) 1 see 598; AIR 1991 se420
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In the Doon Valle/7 case Art. 21 was invoked by the court to prevent the
degradation of Mussori Hills due to the mining operations there, which was becoming a health hazard. The court held that Art. 21 included in its sweep a right
to clean environment and that the permanent assets of the mankind cannot be
allowed to be exhausted in our generation. Again, in M.e. Mehta v. Union of
India28 the Supreme Court reiterated the fundamental right to a clean environment
for healthy living and held that pollution treatment plant is a fore-condition of the
existence and continuation of an industry. It observed:
"just like an industry which cannot pay minimum wages to its workers, cannot be allowed to exist, a tannery which cannot set up a primary treatment
plant cannot be permitted to continue."
As otherwise it would pose threat to the health and well-being of the citizens
residing in the surrounding areas.
In the Olleum Gas Leak29 case the rule of strict liability was applied without
exception to a polluting undertaking employing hazardous process of manufacture.
Bhagwati, C.J. observed in this case:
"An enterprise engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous industrial activity posing a potential threat to the health and safety of persons working in
the factory and residing in the surrounding area was under an obligation to
pay compensation for the injury caused."
Article 48A of the Constitution provides:
"48A. Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life.- The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the
environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country."
Indeed, this Article is a part of the Directive Principles of the State Policy and not
of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. But the directive principles of State Policy
are complementary to the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of
India as they spell out the obligation of the State towards the citizen in the discharge of its functions. Resort had by the judiciary to the directive principles for
interpreting the content of the fundamental rights is therefore logical. A reference
to Article 51A(g) detailing the fundamental duties of the citizens, which reads, "to

27

Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra

see 463;

28

(1987) 4

29

M.C. Mehta

Y.

AIR 1988

Y.

State ofU.P., (1985) 2

se 1037.

Union of India, (1987) 1

se 395.

see 431, AIR

1985

se 652.
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protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rives and wild
life, and to have compassion for living creatures", is also interesting in this context.
It also needs to be stated that the courts when they deal with cases concerning "environment" do not by themselves act as experts. They rely upon expert
bodies like National Environment Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) which
are requested by the courts to examine the grievance relating to environmental
pollution and submit their report. The courts also call upon the Pollution Control
Boards of the Union or the State, as the case may be, to submit their reports and
then base their judgements on expert opinion. The argument that courts were
hithertofore not entering into this domain, does not mean that courts should not act
when called upon by the citizens to protect the environment so as to make it possible for the citizen to enjoy the right of healthy and decent life guaranteed by Article
21 of the Constitution. The argument that since it has not been done before therefore it should not be done now is illogical. If courts do not interpret the law in a
manner consistent with the mandate of Article 21, only because it had not been
done before, then while the society would move, the law would remain static and
that would be bad both for law and the society. Law must move with the society so
as to respond to its hopes and aspirations.
It must, however, be remembered that the Judges in exercise of their power
of judicial review, are not expected to decide a dispute or controversy which is
purely theoretical or for which there are no judicially manageable standards available with them. The courts do not generally speaking interfere with the policy
matters of the Executive unless the policy is either against the Constitution or
some statute or is actuated by malafides. Policy matters, fiscal or otherwise, are
thus best left to the judgment of the executive. However, once it is conceded that
right to life guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to live decently, the interference by the courts to ensure the same by making attempts to prevent pollution
of environment cannot but be considered as a legitimate exercise in discharge of
the constitutional obligation by the judiciary.
Having talked about human rights and the constitutional obligations of the
courts to protect the same, there is one important aspect which needs to be dealt
with by me and that is the need of "self restraint" by the Judges while expanding
and expounding the law in response to the call and need of the society in exercise
of their power of judicial review.
It is in fact stating the obvious to say that courts must while exercising the
power of judicial review exercise restraint and base their decisions on recognised
doctrines or principles of law. Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint are two
sides of the same coin. It is therefore essential to remember that judicial restraint
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in the exercise of its functions is of equal importance for the judiciary while discharging its judicial obligations under the Constitution. With a view to see that
judicial activism does not become "judicial adventurism" and lead a judge going
in pursuits of his own notions of justice and beauty, ignoring the limits of law, the
bounds of his jurisdiction and the binding precedents, it is necessary and essential
that "public interest litigation" which is taken recourse to for reaching justice to
those who are for variety of reasons unable to approach the court to protect their
fundamental rights should develop on a consistent and firm path. The courts must
be careful to see that by their over-zealousness they do not cause any uncertainty
or confusion either through their observations during the hearing of a case or through
their written verdicts. If unmindful of the expected restraint, the courts make observations orally or through written decisions, one way or the other, under the
cover of judicial activism they may consciously or unconsciously cause uncertainty and confusion in the law. In that event, the law will not only develop along
uncertain lines instead of straight and consistent path but the judiciary's image
may also in the bargain get tarnished and its respectability eroded. That would be
a sad day. Judicial authoritarianism cannot be permitted under any circumstances.
The courts, therefore, have to be very careful to see that their exercise of judicial
creativity for attaining social change is not allowed to run amuck and every court
functions within the bounds of its own prescribed jurisdiction. The courts have the
duty of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights
but they cannot push back the limits of the Constitution to accommodate the challenged violation. All it means is that Judges are expected to be circumspect and
self disciplined in the discharge of their judicial functions.
The virtue of humility in the Judges, a constant awareness that the investment
of power in them is meant for use in public interest and to uphold the majesty of
rule of law and the realisation that Judges are not infallible even if final, would
ensure the requisite self-restraint in discharge of all judicial functions because all
actions of a judge must be judicious in character. As Justice Michael Kirby ofthe
High Court of Australia rightly said, not too long ago, while addressing Bangalore
Advocates Association on 13th January 1997, "of Judges, the community expects
honesty, integrity and learning".
Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon, the outgoing Director of the National Law School
ofIndia University in his article "Committed to Judiciousness" which appeared in
the Calcutta edition of The Daily Telegraph on 11th August 1997 very rightly
said:
"Judicial review is a weapon to discipline abuse of executive power ... Any
institution with such vast powers can become a threat if it does not have
Judges of the highest integrity, sensitivity to constitutional values and great
professional competence".
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The criticism that since the judiciary in India is not elected, it should confine
itself to its orthodox role, and leave all other matters to the elected representatives,
is based on a grave misconception about the source of power of the judiciary and
the role assigned to it. To say and believe that judiciary is not accountable to any
one is misleading. The Constitution is the fundamental law of the land which
establishes the judiciary and empowers it to eliminate those acts of the legislature
and/or actions of the executive as are found to unconstitutional. The courts are the
guardians of the Constitution framed by WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA and have to
act according to their conscience to uphold the Constitution. The courts act for the
people who have reposed confidence in them. The accountability of the Judges is,
therefore not only to their conscience but also to the PEOPLE in whom the ultimate sovereignty vests. Judges are the servants of law and function for the society
and therefore are accountable to it. The real source of the strength of the judiciary
lies in the public confidence in the institution. It is, therefore, imperative that the
actions of the judges are transparent and constitutionally sound and their vast power
is used in public interest to uphold the majesty of law and the Constitution - to
uphold which they subscribe the oath when entering upon their office. Erosion of
credibility of the judiciary, in the public mind, for whatever reasons, is the greatest
threat to the independence of the judiciary. Eternal vigilance by the Judges to
guard against and such latent internal danger is, therefore, necessary, lest we "suffer from self-inflicted mortal wounds". American Judge and Jurist Felix
Frankfurther once when asked about the three most important judicial qualities
remarked - "First detachment; Second detachment and Third detachment" - Let
this truism for ever remain present to the mind of the Judges while dealing with a
cause or controversy before them and once they are conscious of it, "judicial restraint" will not remain far behind. The societal perception of Judges as being
detached and impartial referees is the greatest strength of the judiciary and every
Judge must ensure that this perception should not receive a set back. To the extent
that judicial activism is making the legislative and executive branches function
properly in accordance with the rule oflaw, the courts functioning is unexceptionable but we must remember that sole check on judicial power is the use of proper
judicial restraint by the Judges in discharge of their functions. The courts, must
however not shy away from discharging their constitutional obligations to protect
and enforce human rights of the citizens and while acting within the bounds of law
must always rise to the occasion as "guardians of the Constitution", criticism of
"judicial activism" not withstanding.
The society has placed Judges on a high pedestal. We must justify that position in the Society remembering for ever that the Constitution does not give unlimited powers to anyone including the judges of all levels.

